There are few fields in KDB structures that have 'conflicting' types but
need to be compared. They come from MIT Kerberos and we have no choice
here.
In the same way, SID structures have own requirements.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Calling to ipadb_get_connection() will remove LDAP context if any error
happens. This means upper layers must always verify that LDAP context
exists after such calls.
ipadb_get_user_auth() may re-read global configuration and that may fail
and cause IPA context to have NULL LDAP context.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/8681
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
In case we've got a principal name as '*', we don't need to specify
the principal itself, use pre-defined filter for a wild-card search.
Previously, we had to escape the '*' as specifying it with an explicit
matching rule would have violated RFC 4515 section 3. However, since we
don't really need to specify a different matching rule for a wild-card
search, we can remove this part completely.
Use this change as an opportunity to simplify the code and reduce
number of duplicated filter constants -- if extra filter is NULL, we can
simply pass "" and use _EXTRA filter constants to format the final
filter.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/8624
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
kadmin.local getprincs command results in passing '*' as a principal to
KDB driver function that looks up the principals.
The whole filter looks like this
(&(|
(objectclass=krbprincipalaux)
(objectclass=krbprincipal)
(objectclass=ipakrbprincipal))
(|(ipakrbprincipalalias=*)
(krbprincipalname:caseIgnoreIA5Match:=*)))
There are two parts of the LDAP filter we use to look up principals, the
part with 'krbprincipalname' uses extensible filter syntax of RFC 4515
section 3:
extensible = ( attr [dnattrs]
[matchingrule] COLON EQUALS assertionvalue )
/ ( [dnattrs]
matchingrule COLON EQUALS assertionvalue )
In case we've got a principal name as '*' we have to follow RFC 4515
section 3 and reencode it using <valueencoding> rule from RFC 4511
section 4.1.6 but only to the part of the filter that does use assertion
value.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/8490
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Restructure logic of ipadb_get_principal() to separate retrieval of a
principal by a name and by an alias. Separate enterprise principal name
type processing into a helper function to be able to reuse it for own
aliases.
Unify code in client referrals part to do the same and use krb5 API to
deal with principals rather than parsing strings. The end result is the
same but we follow common rules in MIT Kerberos to process principals.
An enterprise principal is typically "name@SOMEREALM@REALM", but any
principal might be parsed as enterprise principal, so we could get
"name@REALM" marked as such. When unparsing the enterprise principal,
re-parse it again with default realm values, to get our realm
normalization.
This behavior would fix situations when GSSAPI calls are operating on a
non-qualified principal name that was imported as a
GSS_KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_NAME when calling gss_import_name().
Related: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/8319
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
Implement minimal server referrals support for enterprise principals as
defined in RFC 6806.
Use krb5_pac_verify_ext() and krb5_pac_sign_ext() to support cross-realm
S4U extensions. We have to verify/sign PAC and take the realm into
account for S4U in these cases.
The use of extended functions require krb5 1.17+.
For PAC verification, we have to filter existing PAC CLIENT-INFO
structure in cross-realm S4U case because otherwise old CLIENT-INFO
would change the PAC principal due to adding or ommiting the realm in
transition. Since a new PAC CLIENT-INFO will be provided by
k5_insert_client_info() anyway, we can filter it in all cases.
Generate PAC only for the first S4U2Self request to the client realm
(client != NULL). Otherwise, use the PAC from the cross-realm ticket.
The latter PAC belongs to the impersonated user.
Foreign (inner) principal look up in non-AS request returns
KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY.
Finally, in PAC signing we have to take the realm into account as well
for S4U2Self cross-realm operation. This does not work when compiling
against krb5 1.17 at the moment because sign_authdata() callback does
not know whether we are dealing with an issuing referral or not. In 1.18
a KDC will set a special client flag to signify this when asking KDB
driver to sign a PAC record.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/8319
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
BER structure representing a string might not have termination '\0'
character, thus we should use length-bound functions to operate on it.
Memory handling of LDAP values was leaving previous vals over iteration.
Also, when freeing vals, we need to explicitly set it to NULL.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/8291
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <ssorce@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Christian Heimes <cheimes@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Simo Sorce <ssorce@redhat.com>
`vals` is often leaked during early exit. Refactor function to use a
single exit path to prevent this.
Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
With commit 15ff9c8 a check was removed and as a result Kerberos keys
are unconditionally added to the user entry struct if they are
available. As a result the password related pre-authentication methods
PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP and PA-ETYPE-INFO2 are advertised in the NEEDED_PREAUTH
reply to an AS_REQ.
With respect to the KDC policies this does not matter much because if
password authentication is disabled for the given principal the policy
will reject the AS_REQ if the user tries password authentication. This
is possible because with commit 15ff9c8 kinit will ask for a password if
called without any additional options (e.g. armor ticket or PKINIT
identity). Before 15ff9c8 was committed it just failed with 'kinit:
Pre-authentication failed: Invalid argument while getting initial
credentials' because no suitable pre-authentication method was
available. This is the same behavior as if no password was set for the
given principal.
But with this change SSSD fails to detect the available authentication
types for the given principal properly. As described in
https://docs.pagure.org/SSSD.sssd/design_pages/prompting_for_multiple_authentication_types.html
SSSD uses the MIT Kerberos responder interface to determine the
available authentication methods for the principal and does not check
the ipaUserAuthType LDAP attribute. As a result if a user has 2FA (otp)
authentication configured, which implies that a password is set as the
first factor, the responder interface will always indicate that password
authentication is available even if only opt is enabled for the user.
In this case SSSD will use a prompting which indicates that the second
factor might be optional. Additionally if prompting the user directly is
not possible (e.g. ssh with ChallengeResponseAuthentication /
KbdInteractiveAuthentication disabled) the single string entered by the
user will always be assumed as a password and not as a combination of
password and otp-token value. As a consequence authentication will
always fail because password authentication is disabled for the user and
since SSSD does not do try-and-error 2FA is not tried.
This patch add back the check so that if password authentication is not
available for the principal the Kerberos will not be added to the entry
struct and the KDC will not advertise PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP or
PA-ETYPE-INFO2. If you think this is wrong and the behavior added by
15ff9c8 should be preferred SSSD handing of the available authentication
types must be extended to read ipaUserAuthType as well to restore the
user experience with respect to 2FA prompting and ssh behavior.
Related to https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/8001
Reviewed-By: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
For the authentication indicators 'otp', 'radius', 'pkinit', and
'hardened', allow specifying maximum ticket life and maximum renewable
age in Kerberos ticket policy.
The policy extensions are now loaded when a Kerberos principal data is
requested by the KDC and evaluated in AS_REQ KDC policy check. If one of
the authentication indicators mentioned above is present in the AS_REQ,
corresponding policy is applied to the ticket.
Related: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/8001
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <frenaud@redhat.com>
lcontext may be NULL here, probably due to a restarted 389ds. Based on
a patch by Rob Crittenden.
Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
We created a Kerberos kdcpolicy plugin to enforce user
pre-authentication policy for newly added pkinit and hardened policy.
In the past version of freeIPA, password enforcement exists but was done
by removing key data for a principal while parsing LDAP entry for it.
This hack is also removed and is now also enforced by kdcpolicy plugin
instead.
Resolves: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/8001
Signed-off-by: Changmin Teng <cteng@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Simo Sorce <ssorce@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
ipadb_get_global_config() is permitted to return NULL.
Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Christian Heimes <cheimes@redhat.com>
While processing enterprise principals the information about trusted domains
might not be up-to-date. With this patch ipadb_reinit_mspac() is called if an
unknown domain is part of the enterprise principal.
Resolves https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/7172
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
DAL version 6.0 removed support for a callback to free principal.
This broke KDB drivers which had complex e_data structure within
the principal structure. As result, FreeIPA KDB driver was leaking
memory with DAL version 6.0 (krb5 1.15).
DAL version 6.1 added a special callback for freeing e_data structure.
See details at krb5/krb5#596
Restructure KDB driver code to provide this callback in case
we are built against DAL version that supports it. For DAL version
prior to 6.0 use this callback in the free_principal callback to
tidy the code.
Use explicit KDB version dependency in Fedora 26+ via BuildRequires.
With new DAL version, freeipa package will fail to build and
we'll have to add a support for new DAL version explicitly.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/6619
Reviewed-By: Simo Sorce <ssorce@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
When canonicalization is requested, the krbprincipalname attribute is searched
for case-insensitively.
In the case that krbcanonicalname is not set, the matched alias is returned
with the casing stored in backend, not the one input by client.
Part of https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/3864
Reviewed-By: David Kupka <dkupka@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Simo Sorce <ssorce@redhat.com>
Before this patch, if either password or password+otp were permitted,
only the otp preauth mech would be returned to the client. Now, the
client will receive either enc_ts or enc_chl in addition to otp.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/433
Reviewed-By: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Store and retrieve the authentication indicator "require_auth" string in
the krbPrincipalAuthInd attribute. Skip storing auth indicators to
krbExtraData.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/5782
Reviewed-By: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Some legacy softare is not able to properly cope with preauthentication,
allow the admins to disable the requirement to use preauthentication for
all Service Principal Names if they so desire. IPA Users are excluded,
for users, which use password of lessere entrpy, preauthentication is
always required by default.
This setting does NOT override explicit policies set on service principals
or in the global policy, it only affects the default.
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Ticket: https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/3860
Reviewed-By: Martin Babinsky <mbabinsk@redhat.com>
Needs a 'break' otherwise prevents correct reporting of data and it always overrides
it with the placeholder data.
Reviewed-By: Simo Sorce <ssorce@redhat.com>
When kadmin tries to change a password it will get the allowed keysalts
from the password policy. Failure to provide them will result in kadmin
using the defaults specified in the kdc.conf file or hardcoded defaults
(the default salt is then of type NORMAL).
This patch provides the supported values that have been read out of the
appropriate LDAP attribute when we read the server configuration.
Then at actual password change, check if kadmin is handing us back the exact
list of supported encsalts we sent it, and in that case replace it with the
real default encsalts.
Fixes https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4914
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin Babinsky <mbabinsk@redhat.com>
In this new MIT version the DAL interface changes slightly but
KRB5_KDB_DAL_MAJOR_VERSION was not changed.
Luckily KRB5_KDB_API_VERSION did change and that's enough to know
what to compile in.
Resolves: https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4861
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
The patch addresses the following defect reported by covscan in FreeIPA
master:
"""
Error: FORWARD_NULL (CWE-476):
/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_principals.c:1886: assign_zero: Assigning:
"principal" = "NULL".
/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_principals.c:1929:
var_deref_model: Passing null pointer "principal" to "ipadb_entry_to_mods",
which dereferences it.
/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_principals.c:1491:9:
deref_parm_in_call: Function "ipadb_get_ldap_mod_str" dereferences
"principal".
/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_principals.c:1174:5:
deref_parm_in_call: Function "strdup" dereferences "value"
"""
This is a part of series of patches related to
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4795
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Before this patch, ipa-kdb would load global configuration on startup and
never update it. This means that if global configuration is changed, the
KDC never receives the new configuration until it is restarted.
This patch enables caching of the global configuration with a timeout of
60 seconds.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4153
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
When an entry has a krbCanonicalName, if KRB5_KDB_FLAG_ALIAS_OK is set,
rewrite the principal name to the canonical value, else error out,
instead of always returning an error if the requested name doesn't look
like the canonical one.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/3966
Reviewed-By: Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@redhat.com>
If the KDC doesn't use the FreeIPA password for authentication, then it is
futile to provide this information. Doing so will only confuse the user. It
also causes password change dialogues when the password is irrelevant.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4299
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
This handles the case where a user is configured for OTP in ipaUserAuthType,
but the user has not yet created any tokens. Until the user creates tokens,
the user should still be able to log in via password. This logic already
exists in LDAP, but ipa-kdb needs to perform the same validation to know
what data to return to the KDC.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4154
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
If we do not store the keys in the entry we need to free the array before
continuing or the data is leaked.
CoverityID: 11910
Fixes:
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/3884
If OTP is enabled for a user, then:
1. Long-term keys are not provided to KDB
2. The user string 'otp' is defined to KDB
Since it is not secure to send radius configuration information
over krb5 user strings, we simply set the string to a known default
('[]') which enables the default configuration in the KDC.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/3561http://freeipa.org/page/V3/OTP
The ipaKrbAuthzData LDAP attribute is read together with the other data
of the requestedprincipal and the read value(s) are stored in the e-data
of the entry for later use.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/2960
Since in Kerberos V5 are used 32-bit unix timestamps, setting
maxlife in pwpolicy to values such as 9999 days would cause
integer overflow in krbPasswordExpiration attribute.
This would result into unpredictable behaviour such as users
not being able to log in after password expiration if password
policy was changed (#3114) or new users not being able to log
in at all (#3312).
The timestamp value is truncated to Jan 1, 2038 in ipa-kdc driver.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/3312https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/3114
Alexander Bokovoy
Slava Aseev
Rob Crittenden
Christian Heimes
Robbie Harwood
Sumit Bose
Changmin Teng
Sumit Bose
David Kupka
Martin Babinsky
Nathaniel McCallum
Matt Rogers
Simo Sorce
Martin Basti
Nalin Dahyabhai
Nathaniel McCallum
Tomas Babej