This fixes the case where an account is locked on one or more servers
and the password is reset by an administrator. The account would
remain locked on those servers for the duration of the lockout.
This is done by setting krbLastAdminUnlock to the current date and
time. The lockout plugin will see this and unlock the account. Since
the value should be replicated along with the password any server
that has the new password will also be unlocked.
This does incur an additional attribute that must be replicated,
whether it is needed or not, but since lockout is computed
per-server this is the only guaranteed way to be sure that the
account will be unlocked everywhere.
My original thought was to grab password replication events and detect
whether the user was locked out and unlock them. On any given server
you can only know if the user is locked out on that server by
computing it. Doing this would require generalizing the lockout code
so it could be computed on password change. krbLastFailedAuth could
be wiped which would unlock the account on that master (the attribute
is not replicated by default).
So it is complexity vs additional replication. Assuming that admin
reset is relatively rare let's start with that. This doesn't lock
us into this solution for the future.
We could set this attribute on user-driven password changes as
well but the original ask and my thinking are that if you forgot
your password and got locked out, how can you change it yourself?
Upon reflection I guess a user could fat-finger it a bunch of times
against one IPA server then have a revelation and log in against a
different server. So they would still be locked out for the duration
on the first one. I'm not sure the extra replication is worth it for
user-generated password changes or that users would be saavy enough
to try another server for the change.
https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/8551
Signed-off-by: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Enable checking:
maxrepeat - reject passwrods which contain more than N consecutive
characters.
maxsequence - rejected passwords which contain character sequences
(abcde).
dictcheck - check passwords using cracklib
usercheck - check whether the password contains the user name.
The class checking provided by libpwpolicy is not used because this
overlaps with the existing IPA checking. This includes the options
dcredit, ucredit, lcredit, ocredit, minclass and maxclassrepeat.
The pwquality min length is fixed at 6 so if there is a conflict between
the system policy and pwquality log that length is enforced at 6.
https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/6964https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/5948https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/2445https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/298
Signed-off-by: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Christian Heimes <cheimes@redhat.com>
cast const error message to non-const char*. I tried to make errMesg a
const char* but it gets passed down to slapi_send_ldap_result() which
accepts a char*.
Signed-off-by: Christian Heimes <cheimes@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
NIST SP 800-63-3B sets a recommendation to have password length upper bound limited in A.2:
https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html#appA
Users should be encouraged to make their passwords as lengthy as they
want, within reason. Since the size of a hashed password is independent
of its length, there is no reason not to permit the use of lengthy
passwords (or pass phrases) if the user wishes. Extremely long passwords
(perhaps megabytes in length) could conceivably require excessive
processing time to hash, so it is reasonable to have some limit.
FreeIPA already applied 256 characters limit for non-random passwords
set through ipa-getkeytab tool. The limit was not, however, enforced in
other places.
MIT Kerberos limits the length of the password to 1024 characters in its
tools. However, these tools (kpasswd and 'cpw' command of kadmin) do not
differentiate between a password larger than 1024 and a password of 1024
characters. As a result, longer passwords are silently cut off.
To prevent silent cut off for user passwords, use limit of 1000
characters.
Thus, this patch enforces common limit of 1000 characters everywhere:
- LDAP-based password changes
- LDAP password change control
- LDAP ADD and MOD operations on clear-text userPassword
- Keytab setting with ipa-getkeytab
- Kerberos password setting and changing
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/8268
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <ssorce@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Simo Sorce <ssorce@redhat.com>
While other password policies were properly ignored the password
history was always being saved if the global history size was
non-zero.
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Christian Heimes <cheimes@redhat.com>
Password changes performed by cn=Directory Manager are excluded from
password policy checks according to [1]. This is correctly handled by
ipa-pwd-extop in case of a normal Kerberos principal in IPA. However,
non-kerberos accounts were not excluded from the check.
As result, password updates for PKI CA admin account in o=ipaca were
failing if a password policy does not allow a password reuse. We are
re-setting the password for PKI CA admin in ipa-replica-prepare in case
the original directory manager's password was updated since creation of
`cacert.p12`.
Do password policy check for non-Kerberos accounts only if it was set by
a regular user or admin. Changes performed by a cn=Directory Manager and
passsync managers should be excluded from the policy check.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/7181
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
[1] https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_directory_server/10/html/administration_guide/user_account_management-managing_the_password_policy
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Christian Heimes <cheimes@redhat.com>
On two occasions C code abused strncpy()'s length limitation to copy a
string of known length without the trailing NULL byte. Recent GCC is
raising the compiler warning:
warning: ‘strncpy’ output truncated before terminating nul copying as
many bytes from a string as its length [-Wstringop-truncation]
Use memcpy() instead if strncpy() to copy data of known size.
See: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/7738
Signed-off-by: Christian Heimes <cheimes@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Use a helper function to perform operations on dates in LDAP attributes.
Related to #2795
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Kupka <dkupka@redhat.com>
The KDB driver does not walk the tree back like the original password plugin.
Also we do not store the default policy in the base DN as we used to do in the
past anymore.
So doing a full subtree search and walking back the tree is just a waste of
time.
Instead hardcode the default policy like we do in the kdb driver.
Fixes: https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4085
When Directory Manager or a PassSync agent is changing a password,
it is not being expired, but standard expiration time should apply.
However, default expiration time was always applied (90 days)
even though administrator may have a custom policy for the user.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/3968
Rob Crittenden
Christian Heimes
Alexander Bokovoy
Sumit Bose
Thierry Bordaz
Simo Sorce
David Kupka
Nathaniel McCallum
Martin Kosek