In LDAP auto-bind situation we will not have a Kerberos principal
available, so we should be using a different mechanism to find the
object. Since we already have a valid bound LDAP DN, use it as a base DN
here and simply require presence of the POSIX account.
This will not match 'cn=Directory Manager' but none of the code we have
uses LDAP auto-bind as root when calling 'ipa user-find --whoami'.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9583
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Thomas Woerner <twoerner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rafael Guterres Jeffman <rjeffman@redhat.com>
In server-like context we use LDAPI connection with auto-binding to LDAP
object based on the UID of the process connecting to LDAPI UNIX domain
socket. This means context.principal is not set and we cannot use it.
When processing certificate issuance requests a care has to be done to
match operations done as LDAP auto-bind to actual principals for
validation. This is a tough one as we have no principal to match for
cn=Directory Manager. Use fake principal to fail validation here and
rely on LDAP ACIs instead.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9583
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Thomas Woerner <twoerner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rafael Guterres Jeffman <rjeffman@redhat.com>
We only get to this code path when running in the server context. At
that point _bindings_installed will be defined. Pylint cannot track this
and always fails with this check.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Thomas Woerner <twoerner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rafael Guterres Jeffman <rjeffman@redhat.com>
In server-like context we use LDAPI connection with auto-binding to LDAP
object based on the UID of the process connecting to LDAPI UNIX domain
socket. This means context.principal is not set and we cannot use it.
Make sure to reject requests unless we are operating as a Directory
Manager in such cases.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9583
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Thomas Woerner <twoerner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rafael Guterres Jeffman <rjeffman@redhat.com>
In server-like context we use LDAPI connection with auto-binding to LDAP
object based on the UID of the process connecting to LDAPI UNIX domain
socket. This means context.principal is not set and we cannot use it.
Make sure to reject requests unless we are operating as a Directory
Manager in such cases.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9583
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Thomas Woerner <twoerner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rafael Guterres Jeffman <rjeffman@redhat.com>
In server-like context we use LDAPI connection with auto-binding to LDAP
object based on the UID of the process connecting to LDAPI UNIX domain
socket. This means context.principal is not set and we cannot use it.
Make sure to reject requests unless we are operating as a Directory
Manager in such cases.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9583
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Thomas Woerner <twoerner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rafael Guterres Jeffman <rjeffman@redhat.com>
When batch runs under server context, we have no context.principal set
because we talk directly to LDAPI endpoint and authenticate using
auto-binding, not GSSAPI. Account to that in the logger.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9583
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Thomas Woerner <twoerner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rafael Guterres Jeffman <rjeffman@redhat.com>
In server-like context we use LDAPI connection with auto-binding to LDAP
object based on the UID of the process connecting to LDAPI UNIX domain
socket. This means context.principal is not set and we cannot use it.
In principal_has_privilege() we can take None principal object as a sign
that currently bound LDAP DN has to be checked for the privilege. This
allows to match any type of account to the privilege, with exception of
the cn=Directory Manager which is never added to privileges explicitly.
cn=Directory Manager will be allowed any privilege because it already
can write to any LDAP entry.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9583
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Thomas Woerner <twoerner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rafael Guterres Jeffman <rjeffman@redhat.com>
SID anchors are only resolvable on servers with DCERPC bindings
installed. On non agent replica these bindings are not installed and
therefore group and role management if there are AD user idoverride
members.
If there is an ipaUserOverride for the anchor, the ipaoriginaluid is
returned.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9544
Signed-off-by: Thomas Woerner <twoerner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
If there is no token name it is safe to assume that an HSM
installation is not requested. The validator assumes that if
there is a token name then the library and password are also
provided.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9593
Signed-off-by: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <frenaud@redhat.com>
Don't blow up if the expected module is not installed but warn
about it. Hopefully users will actually read the output and/or the
installation log.
This is done by looking for strings in the path. Not great but
it's at least something.
Related: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9273
Signed-off-by: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <frenaud@redhat.com>
hsm_validator was validating that the token was available but
not that the provided password worked. Add that capability.
Also call it early in the CA and KRA installation cycle so that
it errors out early. This is particularly important for the KRA
because there is no uninstaller.
Bump the minimum PKI release to 11.5.0 as that contains important
fixes for the HSM.
Remove an unused arguments to hsm_version and hsm_validator.
Related: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9273
Signed-off-by: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <frenaud@redhat.com>
If a certificate on a token does not have NSS trust set then
it won't be visible in the softoken. This can be disconcerting
for those used to seeing all the certificates.
Loop through the possibilities and set no trust (or Peer) for
all the certificates on the token.
Also ensure that the CA certificate has the correct nickname.
Related: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9273
Signed-off-by: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <frenaud@redhat.com>
Not all HSMs support PKCS#1 v1.5. The nShield nFast is one we know
of so force the KRA to use OAEP in this case..
This can be seen in HSMs where the device doesn't support the
PKCS#1 v1.5 mechanism. It will error out with either "invalid
algorithm" or CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED.
There is currently no good way to test for this capability in
advance of configuration. Testing for mechanisms alone is
insufficient. The only real way to test would be to attempt a
wrap/unwrap but it is very complex.
If the list of affected HSMs increases we can use a table
instead based on "best guess" of some sort of property but
looking for a unique string inside the library path is a
pretty straigthforward way.
Note that this doesn't preclude someone from wanting to require
OAEP directly by modifying the KRA CS.cfg and it won't impact
FIPs mode which requires OAEP.
Related: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9191
Signed-off-by: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <frenaud@redhat.com>
It would fail eventually with the output in the CA logs but it
wasn't always very obvious and you had to wait a while to find
out about a typo.
Scraping modutil output is a bit ugly but it is guaranteed
to be installed and this should work both with p11-kit and
without.
Related: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9273
Signed-off-by: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <frenaud@redhat.com>
The bulk of the installer effort to enable HSM support without
having to provide an override file.
This pulls the HSM configuration from a remote server when installing
a replica so that the token name and library don't need to be
passed with every installation.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9273
Signed-off-by: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <frenaud@redhat.com>
Pass along the user-provided password file, if any, to the
underlying NSS database. This will provide for per-token
passwords.
If a token is in a nickname then break it out and pass it to
certutil separately.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9273
Signed-off-by: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <frenaud@redhat.com>
Some certificate operations need to be executed as a specific
user so that underlying files will have the correct ownership.
certmogner normally runs as root. The nss-user option defines
a user to switch to when saving NSS certifciates so if a
software token (e.g. SoftHSM) then the files created will be
owned by the token owner.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9273
Signed-off-by: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <frenaud@redhat.com>
ca.certStatusUpdateInterval manages how frequently to update
the certificate status in LDAP (expired, etc).
By default this is not set on the initial master and pkispawn sets
it to 0 on replicas. This can lead to no server running this
task and therefore the status attribute not reflecting the current
state.
On enabling CRL generation remove any value which will cause PKI
to use its default. On disabling set it to 0.
Only one server should run the update status task to prevent
unnecessary replication.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9569
Signed-off-by: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
A previous change made it not possible to remove the admin
user. This also included disabling the admin user. The user can
be disabled, just not deleted because it is required.
Move the test test_ipa_cacert_manage_prune to the end of the
class because it changes time which can break replication.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9489
Signed-off-by: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
The current filter in principal_has_privilege is only working for normal
IPA users where krbprincipalname is matching the principal. An idoverride
user (for example from AD) is not found with this filter.
A new filter for the principal as an ipaOriginalUid has been added as a
second try if a match with krbprincipalname was not found.
principal_has_privilege is used in the replica connection check. The
additional check enables to deploy replicas using an AD user/administrator
that has been added to the "admins" group.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9542
Signed-off-by: Thomas Woerner <twoerner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
The ipa tool has nearly since epoch returned 2 for the case of
entry not found.
The certificate processing raises a separate error,
CertificateOperationsError, when something goes wrong.
This returns 1.
With the introduction of the JSON API most requests will get
a proper HTTP return code representing what went wrong. In this
case we can use 404 to determine if the request resulted in
a NotFound therefore can eventually return a 2 and be
consistent in return values.
Related: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9562
Signed-off-by: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
- kinit helpers are now in `ipalib.kinit`.
- helpers can now use default ccache locations like many other similar
helpers
- helpers return the result from `run` for debugging
- constants are now in `krb_utils`
- helpers pass `KRB5*` and `GSS*` env vars along, so `KRB5_TRACE` works
- document how to kinit for `ipalib.api`
Signed-off-by: Christian Heimes <cheimes@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
SIDGEN plugin only uses local ID ranges and thus a restart is really
needed only when a local range is added, modified or removed.
Also fix the SSSD warning because removal of any range requires restart
everywhere, not just on a specific server.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9558
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
After the addition of a new idrange, the sidgen plugin is not
immediately aware of the new idrange and a restart of 389ds is
required. Otherwise the creation of new user/group with a uid/gid
inside the new range fails to grant a SID to the user/group.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9558
Signed-off-by: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
When get_realmdomains() method is called, it will filter out subdomains
of the IPA primary domain. This is required because Active Directory
domain controllers are assuming subdomains already covered by the main
domain namespace.
[MS-LSAD] 3.1.4.7.16.1, 'Forest Trust Collision Generation' defines the
method of validating the forest trust information. They are the same as
rules in [MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6. Specifically,
- A top-level name must not be superior to an enabled top-level name
for another trusted domain object, unless the current trusted domain
object has a corresponding exclusion record.
In practice, we filtered those subdomains already but the code wasn't
invalidating a previously retrieved forest trust information.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9551
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
When authentication indicators were introduced in 2016, ipa-pwd-extop
plugin gained ability to reject LDAP BIND when an LDAP client insists
the authentication must use an OTP token. This is used by ipa-otpd to
ensure Kerberos authentication using OTP method is done with at least
two factors (the token and the password).
This enfrocement is only possible when an LDAP client sends the LDAP
control. There are cases when LDAP clients cannot be configured to send
a custom LDAP control during BIND operation. For these clients an LDAP
BIND against an account that only has password and no valid token would
succeed even if admins intend it to fail.
Ability to do LDAP BIND without a token was added to allow users to add
their own OTP tokens securely. If administrators require full
enforcement over LDAP BIND, it is cannot be achieved with LDAP without
sending the LDAP control to do so.
Add IPA configuration string, EnforceLDAPOTP, to allow administrators to
prevent LDAP BIND with a password only if user is required to have OTP
tokens. With this configuration enabled, it will be not possible for
users to add OTP token if one is missing, thus ensuring no user can
authenticate without OTP and admins will have to add initial OTP tokens
to users explicitly.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/5169
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
ipa-restore is relying on the presence of specific directories,
e.g. /var/lib/dirsrv/slapd-/db/ipaca, to detect
which backends are in use (userRoot or ipaca).
With the switch to LMDB, these directories do not exist and the
restore fails finding the ipaca backend.
Use lib389.cli_ctl.dblib.run_dbscan utility instead to
check which backends are present.
This method was been introduced in 389ds 2.1.0 and works with
Berkeley DB and LMDB.
Add a --data option to the ipa-backup and ipa-restore tasks to do
only an LDIF backup and restore. Also add the ability to restore by
backend.
Add new tests to do a data-only backup and restore.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9526
Signed-off-by: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
Do minimal validation of the Kerberos principal name when passing it to
kinit command line tool. Also pass it as the final argument to prevent
option injection.
Accepted Kerberos principals are:
- user names, using the following regexp
(username with optional @realm, no spaces or slashes in the name):
"(?!^[0-9]+$)^[a-zA-Z0-9_.][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]*[a-zA-Z0-9_.$-]?@?[a-zA-Z0-9.-]*$"
- service names (with slash in the name but no spaces). Validation of
the hostname is done. There is no validation of the service name.
The regular expression above also covers cases where a principal name
starts with '-'. This prevents option injection as well.
This fixes CVE-2024-1481
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9541
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <frenaud@redhat.com>
ipa-backup is relying on the presence of the directory
/var/lib/dirsrv/slapd-<INSTANCE>/db/ipaca/
to detect if the CA is installed on the server and backup
the ipaca backend.
With the switch to LMDB, this directory does not exist and the
backup is missing ipaca information.
Use lib389.cli_ctl.dblib.run_dbscan utility instead to
check if ipaca backend is present (this method has been
introduced in 389ds 2.1.0 and works with Berkeley DB and LMDB).
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9516
Signed-off-by: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Thierry Bordaz <tbordaz@redhat.com>
Vault uses PKCS1v15 as default padding wrapping algo, which is not an approved
FIPS algorithm. This commit ensures that KRA is installed with RSA-OAEP if FIPS
is enabled. It also handles upgrade path.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9191
Signed-off-by: Francisco Trivino <ftrivino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
If a vault operation fails, the error message just says "InternalError". This commit
improves error handling of key archival and retrieval calls by catching the PKIException
error and raising it as an IPA error.
Related: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9191
Signed-off-by: Francisco Trivino <ftrivino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Cryptography 42.0.0 introduced two new abstract properties
`not_valid_before_utc` and `not_valid_after_utc`, which are non-naive UTC
variants of the `not_valid_before` and `not_valid_after` properties.
The old properties are deprecated. The changeset also modifies code and
tests to use the new `_utc` variants.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9518
Signed-off-by: Christian Heimes <cheimes@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
This should not have been gated on options.setup_ca because we need
the RA agent on all servers if there is a CA in the topology otherwise
the non-CA servers won't be able to communicate with the CA.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9510
Signed-off-by: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
ca_enable and kra_enabled are intended to be used to identify that
a CA or KRA is available in the topology. It was also being used
to determine whether a CA or KRA service is desired on a replica
install, rather than options.setup_[ca|kra]
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9510
Signed-off-by: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
Some tools may pass None as NetBIOS name if not put explicitly by a
user. This meant to use default NetBIOS name generator based on the
domain (realm) name. However, this wasn't done properly, so None is
passed later to python-ldap and it rejects such LDAP entry.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9514
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
Since commit 5c0e7a5fb4, a new extended
operation to get a keytab is supposed to be used. This keytab
setting/retrieval extended operation checks access rights of the bound
DN to write to a virtual attribute 'ipaProtectedOperation;write_keys'.
If the write isn't allowed, the operation is rejected and ipa-getkeytab
tool falls back to an older code that generates the keytab on the client
and forcibly sets to the LDAP entry. For the latter, a check is done to
make sure the bound DN is allowed to write to 'krbPrincipalKey' attribute.
This fallback should never happen for newer deployments. When enrollemnt
operation is delegated to non-administrative user with the help of 'Host
Enrollment' role, a host can be pre-created or created at enrollment
time, if this non-administrative user has 'Host Administrators' role. In
the latter case a system permission 'System: Manage Host Keytab' grants
write access to 'krbPrincipalKey' attribute but lacks any access to the
virtual attributes expected by the new extended operation.
There is a second virtual attribute, 'ipaProtectedOperation;read_keys',
that allows to retrieve existing keys for a host. However, during
initial enrollment we do not allow to retrieve and reuse existing
Kerberos key: while 'ipa-getkeytab -r' would give ability to retrieve
the existing key, 'ipa-join' has no way to trigger that operation.
Hence, permission 'System: Manage Host Keytab' will not grant the right
to read the Kerberos key via extended operation used by 'ipa-getkeytab
-r'. Such operation can be done later by utilizing 'ipa
service/host-allow-retrieve-keytab' commands.
Fix 'System: Manage Host Keytab' permission and extend a permission test
to see that we do not fallback to the old extended operation.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9496
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Alexander Bokovoy
Rob Crittenden
Thomas Woerner
Pavel Březina
Mark Reynolds
Christian Heimes
Florence Blanc-Renaud
Francisco Trivino